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LETTER DATED 25 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit a statement of the Spokesman of the General Department of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 24 March 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement dated 24 March 1994 of the Spokesman of the General Department of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

At the recent meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the forces hostile to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea adopted an unreasonable "resolution" against it in defiance of the opposition of many countries and presented it to the United Nations Security Council.

This indicates that the IAEA secretariat is further internationalizing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's "nuclear issue", joining the hostile forces in the efforts to stifle the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and is further broadening its partiality, instead of rectifying it.

The "resolution" alleged that the "non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreement has grown in scope" because we did not allow some of the activities for the continuity of safeguards. This is an assertion totally reversing black and white.

Now we are in a special status with the temporary suspension of the effectuation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's declared withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. So, we are not under obligation to accept routine and ad hoc inspections under the Safeguards Agreement.

What we can allow at this moment is only an inspection for the maintenance of the continuity of safeguards.

The latest inspection by the inspectors group of IAEA was enough to fully confirm that nuclear materials had not been diverted at our nuclear facilities and to definitely maintain the continuity of safeguards.

Therefore, no one can find fault with the results of the recent inspection, saying they are "not satisfactory", and, in particular, they are not qualified even to talk about the alleged "non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreement".

We cannot but take a serious view of the fact that the "resolution" urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to "immediately allow IAEA to complete all requested inspection activities as the first step and to comply fully with the Safeguards Agreement".

During the recent inspection, we fully allowed all inspection activities needed for maintaining the continuity of safeguards in accordance with the Vienna agreement, and we have nothing more to "allow".

The Director General of IAEA himself in his report and address at the meeting of the Board of Governors admitted that all inspection activities had been carried out satisfactorily as demanded by the IAEA secretariat at most of the nuclear facilities.

As for the smear-taking in the glove-box area at the radiochemical laboratory, with which the IAEA secretariat takes issue, it has nothing to do with the maintenance of the continuity of safeguards.

So, the insistence on smear-tests in this area contradicts the Vienna agreement, which says that "this inspection does not include the verification of the completeness of the initial inventory of nuclear material".

Moreover, the smear-taking at the area is a matter of relevance to "inconsistency", an outstanding issue between the two sides.

However, in the spirit of cooperation, we proposed the method of taking samples of tracer liquid whereby to inspect more effectively the glove-box area.

This liquid is what the secretariat of IAEA had put into the three tanks in the glove-box area during their earlier inspection to freeze the outflow of nuclear material in the area.

Accordingly, solution samplings were enough to verify whether or not nuclear material had been diverted in the area.

The inspectors group itself agreed to our constructive proposal and took samples of tracer liquid there.

This notwithstanding, the IAEA secretariat argued in a far-fetched manner that they could not "verify that no reprocessing activities had occurred at the radiochemical laboratory", simply because their request to make a few smear tests was not accepted.

This is unreasonable either from the scientific-technological point of view or in view of the Vienna agreement.

All the facts clearly prove that the purpose of the recent inspection by the IAEA secretariat was not to verify whether or not nuclear materials had been diverted at our nuclear facilities, but to pursue a sinister political aim from the beginning according to a prearranged script.

The IAEA secretariat broadened its partiality still further by adopting another unreasonable "resolution" at the meeting of the Board of Governors.

If the IAEA secretariat really wants to see a fair solution to our "nuclear issue", it should take measures to immediately withdraw its "resolution" which is based on the unjust assessment that IAEA "could not verify non-diversion of nuclear materials" at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities.

If the IAEA secretariat fails to take measures to retract its unreasonable "resolution", we will have no alternative but to take practical steps to counter the broadening partiality on the part of the IAEA secretariat, and the IAEA secretariat will be held totally responsible for all the consequences arising therefrom.